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Abstract
This article uses differing interpretations of a thread of narrative taken from Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four as a springboard to exploring the connection between philosophical truth and political
liberalism. It argues that while no positive connection exists between realist truth and political
liberalism, minimal negative connections do exist between Rorty’s humanistic account of truth and
a basic commitment to democratic and liberal frameworks. It sees these minimal connections as
limiting in their failure to provide a politics that moves beyond an exclusive concern with liberty
and democracy to more substantive political issues of equality and justice. However, it also sees
them as reassuring in showing how acceptance of Rorty’s humanistic account of truth in no way
necessitates adopting his own ethnocentric political stance.
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Does political liberalism require epistemological truth?
And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. (John 8: 32)
Freedom is more important than truth.1 (Rorty)
In Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell painted a well-known and disturbing vision of a possible
future in which the Party was able to determine truth and falsity at a whim through
authoritarian means of control. The main protagonist of the novel, Winston Smith, whose
job it is to generate misinformation through changing the official record of historical
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events, eventually rebels against the dictatorial system of Big Brother. In the early stages
of this rebellion, Orwell describes a scene in which Winston begins to commit ‘thought-
crime’ (acts of thinking deviating from the Party line), fatefully writing down some of what
occurs to him:
The obvious, the silly and the true has got to be defended. Truisms are true, hold on to that!
The solid world exists, its laws do not change. Stones are hard, water is wet, objects unsup-
ported fall towards the earth’s centre. With the feeling that he was speaking to O’Brien, and
also that he was setting forth an important axiom, he wrote: Freedom is the freedom to say
that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.2
Later in the novel, after Winston has been arrested, O’Brien – a character whose job is to
track down potential thought-criminals by posing to be part of the resistance – tortures
Winston into accepting that there exists no reality independent of that defined by the
Party, and, having read Winston’s diary and therefore aware of his particular character-
ization of self-evident reality, tortures him into accepting that two plus two makes five.
O’Brien is not concerned that Winston should merely pronounce that two plus two is
equal to five, and early in the torture when Winston declares this to be the case simply
to stop the pain. O’Brien is unsatisfied with his lack of sincerity. O’Brien wants Winston
to really believe it to be the case, and he continues torturing him until the point at which
he is mentally rearranged into truly believing that ‘two plus two is five’. This episode is
of interest here because Orwell appears to be connecting epistemological matters of truth
and falsity with broader political issues of liberty and autonomous choice.
While Orwell’s moral commitment to the virtue of truth in a normative sense is in no
way controversial,3 interpretation of his epistemological position has been more so. One
common reading of this aspect of the novel is that a solid and objective sense of truth is
essential to the maintenance of liberty; if a society loses truth it has lost its ability to func-
tion as a free society. As Rorty puts it, ‘Orwell has, in short, been read as a realist phi-
losopher, a defender of common sense against its cultured, ironist despisers’.4 This is
the interpretation that Bernard Williams favours, claiming that we cannot distinguish
between ‘acceptable and unacceptable ways of inducing belief . . . without mentioning
the truth’,5 and therefore that O’Brien’s actions are wrong because they functioned to
‘subvert true belief so as to destroy his [Winston’s] relation to the world altogether,
undoing the distinctions between reality and fantasy’ (TAT, p. 148). The destruction
of Winston’s capacity to hold an adequate truth/falsity distinction, according to Wil-
liams, is therefore at the heart of Orwell’s moral, and indeed political, warning.
Rorty, however, claims that it is not so much that Winston is made to believe some-
thing that is untrue that is problematic, but that he is made to believe something he does
not wish to. He argues that if Winston had been tortured into accepting a truth against his
will by the Party, the moral of the tale would still hold. Torture and the denial of free-
dom, in other words, not truth, are seen by Rorty to be at the core of what is morally
wrong with O’Brien’s actions and politically wrong with the broader landscape of power
that defines Oceania in the year 1984. He argues that it is more productive to read this
episode as saying something about torture, and that ‘the question about ‘‘the possibility
of truth’’ is a red herring’ (CIS, p. 182); the wickedness of O’Brien’s acts does not come
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from his distorting Winston’s relationship to the ‘truth’ but from his violent imposition
of one belief, irrelevant of its truthfulness, in place of another.
Rorty sees O’Brien not as a figure who arose through political culture’s abandonment
of its grasp of truth (and therefore to be avoided by vigilantly defending truth), but rather
one that came about as a consequence and expression of a regime specifically designed
to suppress the exercise of freedom, and recall that for Winston, freedom ‘is the freedom
to say that two plus two make four’. On Rorty’s interpretation, O’Brien’s torture was not
primarily intended therefore to distort the truth itself, but simply to get Winston to
believe something for no reason, and therefore to break him; as O’Brien himself says
in the novel, the ‘object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture.
The object of power is power’ (NEF, p. 276). Torture becomes effective in this case
because it exercises absolute and pure power, since ‘getting someone to deny a belief for
no reason is a first step toward making her incapable of having a self because she
becomes incapable of weaving a coherent web of belief and desire’ (CIS, p. 178). By the
end of the novel Winston has entirely lost this ability to weave a coherent web, and this –
the successful denial of his freedom to be who he felt himself to be – is the ultimate
tragedy of the tale. The maxim that Rorty draws from this, is therefore that ‘if we take
care of freedom, truth can take care of itself’ (ibid., p. 176).
Rorty’s interpretation has, however, received much criticism. Conant, for instance,
claims that the most obvious reading of Orwell is ‘inaudible to Rorty’ due to his own
overriding philosophical concerns (RHC, p. 280). This criticism is vindicated in Orwell’s
writing elsewhere that ‘Nazi theory . . . denies that such a thing as ‘‘the truth’’ exists . . . If
the Leader says of such and such an event, ‘‘It never happened’’ – well, it never hap-
pened. If he says that two and two are five – well, two and two are five. This prospect
frightens me much more than bombs.’6 Rorty responds to Conant’s criticism by asserting
that his reading of Orwell ‘was not intended to claim him as a fellow pragmatist, but to
explain why one could be a non-Realist and still have one’s moral horizon expanded by
1984 . . . the idea was to see how the book looks when seen through non-realist eyes
. . . Had Orwell taken an interest in such arguments,’ Rorty comments, ‘I imagine, he
would have sided with the Realists.’7 Rorty’s reading might therefore be taken as an
example of his own understanding of the value and purpose of human culture more
broadly, which he sees as, at its best, not so much aspiring to remain faithful to deep
underlying truths but rather as the cumulative stock and ongoing endeavour to offer edi-
fying and elucidating redescriptions of the world around us.8
Williams, however, takes issue with just this point by arguing that some reference to
the actual truth or falsity of the imposed belief is necessary to make any moral sense out
of the scenario Orwell describes, since without it we are unable to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate forms of inducing belief. ‘We need, for instance,’ he writes,
‘to be able to describe those authoritative forms of persuasion that are legitimated under
the title of ‘‘education,’’ and we have no reason to think that we can do this without using
the notions of truth and falsity’ (TAT, p. 147). Unfortunately, not only does this point to
Williams’ own revealingly narrow, and – for a teacher of the humanities – worryingly
anti-Socratic understanding of a liberal education, but further misses what Rorty argues
is no doubt precisely (at least one necessary part of) Orwell’s message. That is that tor-
ture is wrong per se, and while it may well be Orwell’s intention to present us with a
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particularly disturbing image of torture in showing us a case of torture that reaches so
deep as to distort the victim’s sense of coherent thought and ultimately selfhood, the real-
ity or falsity of this sense of self is hardly the principal ethical issue at hand. Torture
directed towards a victim’s will to truth, in other words, is a particularly abhorrent case
of torture; it is, however, by no means torture’s necessary and definitive characteristic.
Though Williams elsewhere uses the dramatic image of the conclusion of Canetti’s novel
Auto-da-Fe´ to parody Rorty’s position,9 this method of immolating heretics from which
the novel takes its title could just as well be used in Rorty’s defence in providing a clear
example of precisely the kind of suppression of freedom that liberalism, not realism,
helps us avoid. The methods of the Spanish Inquisition are not objectionable to us
because Catholics were on the side of falsity, while Protestants, witches, Jews, or Mus-
lims, were on the side of truth. The means of serving justice to the unfaithful were wrong
because torture was carried out in order to preserve and expand a singular orthodox con-
ception of truth; a truth that was authoritarian and, like in Nineteen Eighty-Four, backed
up by violence as soon as it felt itself to be put into question.
Rorty does not provide specific examples of his maxim that ‘if we take care of free-
dom, truth can take care of itself’ (CIS, p. 176), but perhaps the case of the Soviet biol-
ogist Trofim Lysenko might serve as an illustration. In the context of Stalin’s attempt to
reverse the decline in crop yields brought about by collectivization, Lysenko’s almost
entirely unsupported adoption of a theory of the genetic inheritance of acquired charac-
teristics became official dogma; a dogma supported by the state to the point at which
more justified theories of genetic inheritance were aggressively outlawed.10 Geneticists
who were brave enough to question Lysenko’s pseudo-science often found themselves in
prison or simply shot. The theory famously led to various large-scale catastrophes in
Soviet agriculture, and some argue that it may even have precipitated the fall of the
Soviet Union itself by undermining its agricultural base and eventually forcing it (at least
before Carter’s embargo) to import grain from its great cold war rival, the United States.
Truth became mixed up with political power to such an extent that stepping outside of
orthodox truth immediately put one’s life at risk. Eventually, with successive regime
changes and the slow restoration of political liberty in the USSR, truth – in the particular
pragmatic and humanistic sense that Rorty defends11 – found space to emerge, and
Lysenko was ultimately publicly discredited. This might therefore be used to demon-
strate a situation in which because freedom was suppressed, more justified accounts
of truth were prevented from bubbling to the surface. Once freedom was taken care
of, truth took care of itself.
This example also suggests that in spite of Rorty’s insistence that truth and politics
have no link whatsoever,12 and while they may not be linked in the positive sense that
political systems cannot be defended in terms of being more in touch with certain truths
than others, there may nevertheless be a negative relationship between the two, in the
minimal sense that a determined effort towards protecting a political culture against
affirmative, singular and incontestable conceptions of the True may help defend the
political liberalism that falls in the face of authoritarian Truth. While Todorov is right
therefore in writing that ‘humanism does not define politics with any precision’, and that
‘diverse, indeed contradictory choices, can be compatible with humanist principles’,13 a
humanistic account of the purposes of knowledge does at least seem to defend against the
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dangers of dogma that are embedded in unquestionable assertions of the truth; and a nec-
essary questioning of both asserted truth and ‘common-sense’ received wisdom does
indeed appear to animate most healthy liberal societies. Bronowski even suggests that
the appeal to, and forcible imposition of, absolute truth is a defining characteristic of
totalitarian societies and the crimes that have so often grown out of them. He writes,
in reference to the crematoria at Auschwitz, that ‘when people believe that they have
absolute knowledge, with no test in reality, this is how they behave. This is what men
do when they aspire to the knowledge of Gods.’14 Bronowski’s diagnosis of the funda-
mental danger of totalitarianism is more precise here than (the conventional reading of)
Orwell’s in its comprehension that it was not so much the inherent falsity of Nazism that
made it so deadly, but rather its indomitable singularity; its aspiration to eliminate all
difference, critique and dissent, and therefore its failure to bring its own murderous pre-
mises into question.
This section has suggested that contrary both to Rorty’s claim that understandings of
truth and politics have no connection whatsoever and also to Williams’ belief that liber-
alism must be defended through the defence of realist truth, a healthy political (and
indeed epistemological) culture may in fact be one in which a continual questioning,
rather than perpetual defence, of established truth is cultivated. The remainder of this
article examines the interface between truth and politics as it applies not to politics gen-
erally, but to Rorty’s specific political convictions, and asks whether if a humanistic
understanding of truth connects the notion of truth with beliefs and values (appears to
connect it, in other words, to one’s ethnos) does this mean that such an account of truth
necessitates an ethnocentric politics? After offering a critique of Rorty’s ethnocentrism,
it argues that while adopting his humanistic account of knowledge implies some broad
minimal commitment to models of liberalism and democracy, it in no way necessitates
the particular nationalistic defence of liberal democracy Rorty himself endorses.
Does a humanistic account of truth necessitate an
ethnocentric politics?
Rorty is clear and unapologetic about the fact that he values his own culture and the ways
of life of his own people, whom he provokingly terms ‘postmodern bourgeois liberals’,
above those of others. He explicitly identifies these people with the United States, a
country which he presents as ‘a good example of the best kind of society so far invented’
(PSH, p. 4) even if he recognizes that it has failed to live up to the aspirations of many of
its greatest patriots and reformists.15 In distinction to the standard epistemological scare-
mongering over Rorty’s apparently pernicious ‘cultural relativism’16 – much of which
stems from an unfounded fear of a drift into ethical nihilism17 – Putnam instead notes
that in effect this renders Rorty’s position ‘a form of cultural imperialism rather than cul-
tural relativism’.18 Cultural imperialism is indeed a more worrying outgrowth of Rorty’s
philosophy, and, predictably, this aspect of his thought has received a barrage of criti-
cism.19 Baert, for instance, has questioned Rorty’s sincerity, asking whether he ‘whole-
heartedly believes it is possible to develop a truly progressive agenda for the 21st century
that remains embedded in an overtly nationalistic outlook’?20 In a similar reaction of dis-
belief, Critchley writes that ‘it would perhaps be too easy, but none the less justified, to
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point towards the evidence of imperialism, racism, and colonialism that has always
accompanied – or perhaps has always been behind the cynical veneer of a legitimating
discourse – the expansion of western liberal democracy’.21 Likewise, Turner shows how
Rorty’s defence of American liberalism ‘optimistically ignores the possibility of an
American Empire and the emergence of a predatory democracy’22 stressing how easily
his ethnocentrism lends itself to America’s programme of enforced democratic ‘enlight-
enment’ abroad, in the process clearly undermining its own purported liberalism.
Rorty’s understanding of western liberalism is further limited by a narrowly circum-
scribed conception of what liberty entails.23 Liberty is here understood, as Mill earlier
understood it,24 to involve the freedom to be left alone in order to pursue one’s interests
up to the point at which such a pursuit can be seen to limit others’ similar pursuits, and
therefore the promotion of those institutions that serve primarily to protect individuals
and groups from external interference. This minimal affinity between pragmatism and
liberalism goes back to the former’s origins and James dedicates his introductory lectures
on pragmatism to Mill, ‘from whom’, he writes, ‘I first learned the pragmatic openness
of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive today’ (P, p. 2).
In a typical statement on the matter Rorty talks about ‘the practical advantages of liberal
institutions in allowing individuals and cultures to get along together without intruding
on each other’s privacy, without meddling in each other’s conceptions of the good’.25
This exclusive concern with what Berlin termed ‘negative liberty’26 ignores forms of
‘positive liberty’ involved in providing individuals and groups with the resources and
capacities they need in order to realize their freedoms.27 Although Berlin was extremely
wary of the historical abuses that stemmed from the top-down enforcement of ‘positive
liberties’, others, such as Taylor,28 have demonstrated the equal problems with ignoring
the demands of ‘positive liberty’. More recently, authors such as Brown and Zˇizˇek have
also been particularly incisive at exposing the problems with complacent forms of ‘tol-
erance’ – a peculiarly modern form of negative liberty – stressing the ways in which halt-
ing politics at the goal of ‘toleration’ (e.g. of minority interests) offers a convenient and
frequently patronizing mechanism for avoiding the demands of justice,29 and Rorty’s
neglect of justice is a point upon which the dividing line separating him from Orwell can
indeed be most clearly and confidently drawn.
Rorty’s ethnocentric particularism also sits uneasily with the universalizing tenden-
cies of his purportedly humanistic outlook (PSH, pp. 127–30). This is surprising consid-
ering that, as Bernstein writes, ‘pragmatism, at its very core, has a universalistic thrust.
The central idea of a community of enquirers is incompatible with nationalistic or cul-
tural limitations on such a community.’30 Said also writes that ‘there can be no true
humanism whose scope is limited to extolling patriotically the virtues of our culture, our
language, our monuments. Humanism is the exertion of one’s faculties in language in
order to understand, reinterpret and grapple with the products of language in history,
other languages, and other histories.’31 While Rorty’s humanism therefore offers a useful
account of truth and the value of humanistic learning, it belies its name as humanism
insofar as it is caught up with a condescending defence of the moral superiority of the
West, which, as Nash recognizes, ‘seems to be closely tied to the colonialist stance’.32
In response to a debate initiated by Geertz,33 Rorty attempts to defend his ethnocentr-
ism (or what he prefers to call his ‘anti-anti-ethnocentrism’) by arguing that opposing all
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forms of ethnocentrism halts our ability to hold indignation against acts that from our
positioned and limited standpoints we have reason to find unjust or cruel, leading to a
dangerously naı¨ve state in which we have ‘become so open-minded that our brains have
fallen out’ (OE, p. 526). Geertz, however, reminds Rorty that the radical alternative to
this is a form of arrogant cultural self-assuredness that forestalls understanding and learn-
ing processes between and within cultures, effectively creating ‘windowless’ human com-
munities, constructed as what he describes as ‘semantic monads’ (UOD, p. 262). Writing
from an elite position within the pre-eminent global superpower, it is easy to see why
Rorty may have been particularly vulnerable to the seductions of cultural superiority, but
he claims that while the possibility of creating communities as ‘semantic monads’ is a
risk for certain cultures, it is not a risk for the culture of ‘bourgeois liberalism’ because
(demonstrating again his exclusive liberal concern with ‘negative liberty’) this culture is
characterized by ‘its tolerance of diversity’ and by an ever-expanding openness to others
(OE, p. 526, my emphasis). Unfortunately, while this may perhaps be true of some float-
ing ideal of liberalism, it is not difficult to see that it is utterly contradicted by liberal-
ism’s palpable history, and certainly by its present American manifestation, and to
understand this we need simply to turn to the populations who have been on the receiving
end of America’s outward economic, cultural and political expansion across the globe.
Not only is the way Rorty views the USA in stark contradiction to the way it is actu-
ally experienced externally by other areas of the world, but it is also contradicted by the
way in which it is experienced internally by many of its less powerful minorities. As
Turner recognizes, Rorty’s ‘constant references to a community of like-minded liberal,
bourgeois individuals’ are problematic because they indicate ‘a failure to confront the
postmodern criticism that a community is made up from different voices, all of whom
are competing for recognition in the public arena and who claim that their heterogeneous
voices are not being recognized’ (DOC, p. 284). It is not just this ‘postmodern criticism’
of cultural diversity that it ignores, however, but, as C. Wright Mills recognized, to claim
that we’re ‘‘‘all in this together, the butcher and the general and the ditch digger and the
secretary of the treasury and the cook and the president of the United States’’’ also
ignores the very modern criticism of ‘the facts of power’,34 and therefore neglects the
enduring realities of class in America.35
Rorty’s nationalism is most transparently expressed as an effort towards ‘achieving’ a
country that he clearly felt had not yet achieved itself,36 and therefore, though he fre-
quently conflates the two, one might interpret him more generously as addressing the
promise of American liberalism, rather than its actual expression. Additionally, in the
years preceding his death, he became increasingly critical of American unilateralism,
and allied himself with Derrida and Habermas in countering America’s overseas intimi-
dations.37 Further, Re´e has pointed out that Rorty’s earnest leftist critics too frequently
miss the undeniably funny side of his writing; too often taking the bait of his knowingly
provocative remarks, which, he suggests, ‘are pretty effective as needles for puncturing
pompous conceits: comic devices for winding up those of us who cannot bring ourselves
to admit that our political righteousness may not be quite so self-evident when seen in its
broad practical context, or when measured in terms of its long-range historical effects’.38
However, even when all this is taken into account, politics remains an issue that demands
some level of seriousness, and it is often only the politically dominant who can afford the
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luxury of a joke. The distastefulness of Rorty’s ethnocentrism is made no more palatable
by its blase´ humour, and ultimately it is difficult to see how his position could be squared
with a sincere political humanism. It is therefore important to look further into whether
Rorty’s politics is in fact a logical outcome of his humanistic theory of truth.
John Dewey spent some effort trying to demonstrate the consistency between prag-
matic philosophy and democratic political organization, arguing that the former more
or less implied the latter.39 Rorty, on the other hand, insists that no strong connection
exists between critiquing correspondence theories of truth, and promoting liberal democ-
racy. Quoting Posner, he concurs that the ‘bridge [Dewey] tried to build between epis-
temic and political democracy is too flimsy to carry heavy traffic’,40 and his central
argument in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity is premised upon this separation between
public and private spheres, in which ‘solidarity’ – the project for a more equal and just
society in which we might live collectively with a minimum of humanly inflicted suffer-
ing – is appropriate to the former, while ‘irony’ – the doubting of our own and others’
‘final vocabularies’ and conceptions of the true – is the proper stance within the latter.
This firm analytical divide between the public and private has long been critiqued by
feminists who have drawn attention to its historical role in removing private gender
oppression from public scrutiny and therefore political challenge.41 Criticism has also
been directed towards the apparent aloofness associated with Rorty’s use of the term
‘irony’, and how far a stance of irony can realistically be stretched. Critchley, for
instance, asks whether cruelty is ‘something about which liberals can be ironic’ (DAP,
p. 26)? Nevertheless, Rorty insists that we ought to strive to become ‘liberal ironists’,
people committed to removing cruelty from the world and promoting social justice, but
privately and ironically aware that there are no neutral metaphysical truths upon which
we might ground these commitments. His argument can therefore be read as addressing
two separate groups.
On the one hand he addresses liberal realists: liberals who base their political ideals on
apparently neutral principles such as reason or truth. Rorty wishes to persuade this group
of the contingency of its own vocabularies and therefore the necessity of adopting an iro-
nic stance towards them. Habermas is a good example of this type of non-ironic liberal in
that his theory of communicative action in effect argues that democratic politics is a
more rational system than its alternatives.42 For Habermas, the very act of entering into
rational communication with others in order to elaborate forms of knowledge or reach
agreement relies upon certain ‘validity claims’ that assume the potential of truth as a
goal. From Rorty’s perspective, however, ‘rationality’ or ‘truth’ should be irrelevant
to Habermas’ defence of democratic politics because the communicative practices he
describes ‘do not transcend social convention. Rather, they are regulated by certain par-
ticular social conventions: those of a society, even more democratic, tolerant, leisured,
wealthy and diverse than our own – one in which inclusivism is built into everyone’s
sense of moral identity [and in which] everybody welcomes strange opinions on all sorts
of topics’ (RHC, p. 7). Others, such as Levine, have also pointed out that Habermas’ insis-
tence on arguing for an objective conception of truth and ‘rational consensus’ as a telos of
political deliberation, contradicts his broader pragmatic commitment to anti-foundational-
ism.43 As Bernstein notes, such an ‘appeal to something like a rational consensus has
always been used to block, stifle, or rule out revolutionary turns in the conversation’44
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therefore attempting to secure a zone of non-contingency for liberal politics, where no such
zone in fact exists.
On the other hand, however, Rorty addresses private ironists who refuse public soli-
darity; to this group he wishes to argue that recognition of the contingency of one’s pri-
vate vocabulary must be divorced from political questions; that ‘ideals may be local and
culture-bound, and nevertheless be the best hope of the species’. Liberals should, he
argues, ‘take with full seriousness the fact that the ideals of procedural justice and human
equality are parochial, recent, eccentric, cultural developments, and then . . . recognize
that this does not mean they are any the less worth fighting for’ (OE, p. 208).
Rorty’s doubt ‘that philosophy (even pragmatist philosophy) is ever going to be very
useful for politics’ (DAP, p. 73) is supported by evidence beyond his own claims. Laclau,
for example, shows how a Gramscian politics built around the concept of ‘hegemony’ ‘is
a politics very different from Rorty’s, but perfectly compatible with pragmatic pre-
mises’45 and the politics of West, Unger, Bernstein and the younger Hook offer addi-
tional examples of more radical political approaches being shaped from very similar
underlying humanistic theories of truth. Though they may well reject his terminology,
all these figures have been both committed to public solidarity yet equally faithful to
rejecting an anchoring of that commitment in some ultimate metaphysical grounding.
Occasionally Rorty does allow that there may be some loose connection between his
humanistic account of truth and his political convictions, writing that ‘both are expres-
sions of, and reinforce, the same suspicion of religion and metaphysics. Both can be
traced back to the same historical causes (religious tolerance, constitutional democracy,
Darwin)’ (DAP, pp. 73–4). In addition to these links, the humanistic element in Rorty’s
understanding of truth – the idea that truths are contingent historical products, produced
locally, by and for human beings – seems necessarily to imply, as a minimum, some form
of Deweyian democratic engagement by which humans have the freedom to converse in
unrestricted and equal debate to reach the principles they find useful to hold.46 This link
has also been acknowledged by a variety of other pragmatist thinkers. Bernstein, for
instance, points out that ‘[b]ecause our affirmations do not rest upon fixed foundations,
and are not gratuitous ‘‘decisions,’’ it becomes vital that they become articulated,
debated, and publicly discussed’ (ROP, pp. 839–40). Similarly, Holmwood emphasizes
that dialogue is a necessary element of the pragmatic orientation towards problem-
solving ‘precisely because it is a creative activity’ and ‘problems do not call forth their
own solutions’.47 Turner also notes that ‘democracies are pragmatically justified because
they allow for an open and critical debate between its [sic] citizens’ (DOC, p. 280). Hints
of this can also be found within Rorty’s own writings, particularly in his description of
the ironist as someone who naturally gravitates towards conversation; ‘the person who
has doubts about his [sic] own final vocabulary, his own moral identity, and perhaps his
own sanity – desperately needs to talk to other people’, he writes, ‘because only conver-
sation enables him to handle these doubts, to keep himself together, to keep his web of
beliefs and desires coherent enough to enable him to act’ (CIS, p. 186). The ironist needs
democratic engagement to maintain a sense of his or her sanity and feel that the princi-
ples he or she acts upon can at least be justified to other humans, even if they are unable
to find ultimate justification from the non-human world. For the ironist, the democratic
task becomes ‘how to persuade people to broaden the size of the audience they take to be
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competent, to increase the size of the relevant community of justification’, and, as he lets
slip, the ‘latter project is not only relevant to democratic politics, it pretty much is dem-
ocratic politics’ (RHC, p. 9).
As well as this minimal positive affinity between a democratic impulse and a huma-
nistic account of truth, and even though Rorty repeatedly contests the suggestion that
‘pragmatism entails a commitment to liberalism’ (PSH, p. 271), the above discussion
of Orwell tried to emphasize the fact that a humanistic approach to knowledge must,
as a minimum, be concerned with fighting against the imposition of unquestionable
assertions of truth. Truth, as Foucault noted in his Nietzschean investigations into
power/knowledge, creates its own hidden structures of power, and a healthy political cul-
ture is one in which alternative accounts of the true are given space to develop and in
which current truths are held forever open to future critique and the possibility of novel
paradigmatic reassessment. While, therefore, the quest to ground liberalism or democ-
racy once and for all in the apparently immutable non-human worlds of reason or truth
may forever be in vain, we may nevertheless acknowledge that unassailable assertions of
truth threaten any free political organization of society, and that Rorty is right therefore
in arguing that ‘muddle, compromise, and blurry syntheses are usually less perilous,
politically, than Cartesian clarity’.48
Conclusion
This article has argued that – in partial agreement with Rorty’s own claims – political
liberalism does not rely upon a realist account of truth. It has suggested, however, that
certain minimal links do exist between a humanistic understanding of truth and demo-
cratic and liberal political culture, in that the former lends itself well to defending against
authoritarian impositions of absolute and unimpeachable truth, and that the surfacing of
truth (humanistically conceived) may well be abetted by the freedoms that political lib-
eralism and democratic exchange provide. In this sense therefore, it finds itself in agree-
ment with Baggini’s statement that whatever their usefulness philosophically, Rorty’s
views on truth in practice ‘leave the world [or, he might more accurately have put it, the
liberal democratic world] more or less as it is’.49 Although, therefore, a humanistic
account of truth does not provide any particularly well-defined approach to politics – and
in particular, has very few implications for matters of justice or equality – this article
nevertheless sees it as welcome that Rorty’s epistemological considerations need not
necessitate (and in fact appear largely to contradict) his own nationalistic ethnocentrism;
the implication being therefore, that ‘to criticize Rorty’s politics, does not signify that we
should renounce pragmatism’.50
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